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Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining
Battaglini, Marco - 2019
the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a … coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus it is expected to generate. The formateur is free to change … generalized version of a Nash Bargaining Solution in which —in contrast to the standard solution— the coalition is endogenous and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890469
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The Political Agenda Effect and State Centralization
Acemoglu, Daron - 2016
We provide a potential explanation for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state based on the political agenda effect. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012991695
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Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty
Burger, Nick - 2009
coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the … emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition … coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153581
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Coalition Formation in Political Games
Acemoglu, Daron - 2006
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of … political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of … resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778980
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Strategic Investment in a Debt Bargaining Framework
Aizenman, Joshua - 2008
This paper analyzes the strategic role of investment from a debtor country's perspective. The framework is one in which, if the debtor country is unable to meet debt obligations, a bargaining regime determines the amount of debt repayment. In the context of a two-country real trade model, debt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774533
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Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations : a Strategic Analysis
Fernández, Raquel; Rosenthal, Robert W. - 2021
The process of debt-rescheduling between a creditor and a sovereign (LDC) debtor is modeled as a noncooperative game built on a one-sector growth model. The creditor's threat to impose default penalties is ignored here as inherently incredible; instead, the debtor's motivation for repayment is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013248422
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Game Modelling the Tokyo Round of Tariff Negotiations
Baldwin, Robert E.; Clarke, Richard N. - 2022
Using actual trade and tariff data for the United States and the European Community, this paper demonstrates how a trade negotiation such as the Tokyo Round, can be modelled as a game among countries attempting to minimize individual welfare loss functions. Once welfare functions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013322334
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Communication and Bargaining Breakdown : An Empirical Analysis
Backus, matthew; Blake, Thomas; Pettus, Jett; Tadelis, … - 2022
Bargaining breakdown—whether as delay, conflict, or missing trade—plagues bargaining in environments with incomplete information. Can a bargaining environment that facilitates or restricts communication alleviate these costs? We exploit a unique opportunity to study this question using real...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014091401
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Party Discipline and Pork Barrel Politics
Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan - 2021
Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246299
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Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
Acemoglu, Daron - 2008
determine conditions for their uniqueness. We show how this framework can be applied in political economy, coalition formation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770673