, and market opportunities. This know-how can be reallocated across countries as managers acquire control of factors of …

Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …

We empirically analyze the nature of returns to scale in active mutual fund management. We find strong evidence of … avoid econometric biases are insignificant. We also find that the active management industry has become more skilled over …

. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …

result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a …