We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that under a wide range of conditions the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive...

This paper characterizes the effects of reserve requirements on financial loans in the presence of moral hazard on the lender side (i.e., the anticipation that the taxpayer will bailout lending banks if large default will occur) and sovereign risk on the borrower side. The impacts of such...

This paper develops a dynamic two-country neoclassical stochastic growth model with incomplete markets. Short-term credit flows can be excessive and reverse suddenly. The equilibrium outcome is constrained inefficient due to pecuniary externalities. First, an undercapitalized country borrows too...

We propose a model of sovereign debt where countries vary in their level of financial development, defined as the extent to which countries can hedge rare disasters in international capital markets. We show that low levels of financial development generate the “debt intolerance” phenomenon...

The setup of the paper is as follows: Section I presents a fairly standard, small deterministic macromodel with a number of classical features. All markets clear instantaneously, there is no money illusion, and perfect foresight rules. The effects of monetary, financial, and fiscal policies in...

Sargent and Wallace (S-W) show that, even when inflation is prima facie a strictly monetary phenomenon -- prices are flexible, markets clear and velocity is constant -- inflation is, in the long run, a fiscal phenomenon. This follows from the government budget constraint and the existence of an...

What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending;...

I develop a model in which sovereign debtors repay debt in order to maintain a reputation for repayment. Repayment gives creditors reason to think that the debtor will suffer adverse consequences if it defaults, so they continue to lend. I compare a situation in which competitive lenders earn a...

Deleveraging from high debt can provoke deep recession with significant international side effects. The exchange rate of the deleveraging country will depreciate in the short run and appreciate in the long run. The real interest rate will fall by more than in the rest of the world. Bounds and...

We address the question of whether and how a sovereign should reduce its external indebtedness when default is a significant possibility, with a particular focus on whether a sovereign should buy back or dilute existing long-term sovereign bonds. Our main finding is that when reduction of debt...