Showing 1 - 10 of 415
We examine misconduct in credence good markets with price taking experts. We propose a market-level model in which … price-taking experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm's brand and their own skill. We test the predictions … independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013096847
Consider an environment where long-lived experts repeatedly interact with short-lived customers. In periods when an … appropriate. We find that there exists an equilibrium in which experts always play truthfully and choose the customer's preferred … with high probability if the previous treatment was minor, and low probability if it was major. If experts have private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013160339
We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121588
We propose a dynamic heterogeneous agents model which generates testable hypotheses about the formation, timing and bursting of asset price bubbles in the presence of short-sale constraints, given a calibration that is consistent with momentum and reversal effects for unconstrained assets....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906771
We study pairwise trading mechanisms in the presence of private information and limited commitment, whereby either trader can walk away from a proposed trade when he learns the trading price. We show that when one trader's information is relevant for the other trader's value of the asset,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017078
makes ratings effective, reputation systems, as currently designed, sow the seeds of their own irrelevance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870051
When governments choose trade policy, rarely do they have complete information, At the time decisions are made, policy makers have only estimates of market responses, as well as the responses of foreign governments. In many realistic situations, even the policy objectives of other governments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750737
Markets with asymmetric information will often employ third-party certification labels to distinguish between higher and lower quality transactions, yet little is known about the effects of certification policies on the evolution of markets. How does the stringency in quality certification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912526
This paper examines the effect that the coexistence of small and large banks, with different interests in the international market, has on the debt renegotiation process. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the presence of small banks implies that debtor countries have a harder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124691
In this paper, we examine the empirical implications of reputation formation using a game-theoretic model of intra …-familial interactions. We consider parental reputation in repeated two-stage games in which daughters' decision to have a child as a … work of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) on reputation in repeated games, we show that parents have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310809