calibrated model of employer-sponsored health insurance, we show that the risk adjustment commonly used by employers to offset …

We study the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of competitive insurance markets with endogenous information disclosure by both … supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk individual to full insurance (at his own odds). We …

A feature of many insurance markets is that they combine vertical differentiation (all consumers prefer high to low … US (Frean et al. (2017)). Moreover, it provides a complete characterization of the health insurance “death spiral”. The … minimum coverage standard combined with an insurance mandate cannot restore efficiency. The optimal system depends on both the …

This paper analyzes optimal and equilibrium insurance contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard, comparing …-risk type gets more stringent (i.e. when low risk individuals shirk with lower levels of insurance). We also show that a pooling … accident probability) or when the provision of insurance is non-exclusive (i.e. individuals can purchase insurance from more …

insurance under adverse selection to show that such "initial conditions" can indeed matter. When firms are price-takers, the …

We present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work on selection in insurance markets … insurance allocation, social welfare, and public policy. We then discuss several important extensions to this classical … treatment that are necessitated by important real world features of insurance markets and which can be easily incorporated in …

The willingness to pay for insurance captures the value of insurance against only the risk that remains when choices … are observed. This paper develops tools to measure the ex-ante expected utility impact of insurance subsidies and mandates … existing willingness to pay and cost curve estimates from the low-income health insurance exchange in Massachusetts. Ex …

This paper reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. We focus on … empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage-risk prediction of adverse selection theory--that is, that policyholders … who purchase more insurance coverage tend to be riskier. The analysis of this body of work, we argue, indicates that …