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How Do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?
Shue, Kelly - 2019
We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi-year compensation plans, which generate two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902373
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Growth Through Rigidity : An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay
Shue, Kelly - 2018
The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936509
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Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia
Edmans, Alex - 2014
This paper links the impending vesting of CEO equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the manager's short-term concerns using the sensitivity of his equity to the stock price. However, in myopia theories, the driver of short-termism is not the magnitude of incentives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063030
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Lucky CEOS
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2007
We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778100
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Lucky Directors
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2010
While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760477
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Smokescreen : How Managers Behave When They Have Something to Hide
Artiga González, Tanja - 2013
unusually low CEO turnover and rely on internal management promotions. Their managers exercise stock options faster than … managers of other firms. Cartel firms are large donors to political candidates. While our results are based only upon firms … engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085128
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The Response of Deferred Executive Compensation to Changes in Tax Rates
Gorry, Aspen - 2015
Given the increasing use of stock options in executive compensation, we examine how taxes influence the choice of compensation and document that income deferral is an important margin of adjustment in response to tax rate changes. To account for this option in the empirical analysis, we explore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015981
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Executive Compensation : A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005
Frydman, Carola - 2010
We analyze the long-run trends in executive compensation using a new panel dataset of top executives in large publicly-held firms from 1936 to 2005, collected from corporate reports. This historic perspective reveals several surprising new facts that conflict with inferences based only on data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759098
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The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees
Hallock, Kevin F. - 2010
1990s by a sample of over 2000 middle-level managers from a large, established firm outside of manufacturing. Exercise …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012761772
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The Trouble with Stock Options
Hall, Brian J. - 2010
that we believe explains the over-use of options and several apparent puzzles: boards and managers falsely perceive stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012762807