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On Best-Response Bidding in GSP Auctions

Cary, Matthew - 2015

How should players bid in keyword auctions such as those used by Google, Yahoo! and MSN? We model ad auctions as a dynamic game of incomplete information, so we can study the convergence and robustness properties of various strategies. In particular, we consider best-response bidding strategies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750270

Semiparametric Estimation of a Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information

Bajari, Patrick; Hong, Han - 2021

Recently, empirical industrial organization economists have proposed estimators for dynamic games of incomplete information. In these models, agents choose from a finite number actions and maximize expected discounted utility in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Previous econometric methods estimate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227535

Socially Optimal Coordination : Characterization and Policy Implications

Angeletos, George-Marios - 2007

In recent years there has been a growing interest in macro models with heterogeneity in information and complementarity in actions. These models deliver promising positive properties, such as heightened inertia and volatility. But they also raise important normative questions, such as whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778095

Learning and Disagreement in an Uncertain World

Acemoglu, Daron - 2010

Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individuals, as assumption most often justified by the argument that sufficient common experiences and observations will eliminate disagreements. We investigate this claim using a simple model of Bayesian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760581

Dumping and Double Crossing : the (In)Effectiveness of Cost-Based Trade Policy Under Incomplete Information

Kolev, Dorbin R.; Prusa, Thomas J. - 2021

We argue that the rise of antidumping protection and the proliferation of voluntary export restraints are fundamentally inter-related. We show that both can be explained by a cost-based definition of dumping when the domestic government has incomplete information about the foreign firm's costs....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217200

Estimating Static Models of Strategic Interaction

Bajari, Patrick; Hong, Han; Krainer, John; Nekipelov, Denis - 2021

We propose a method for estimating static games of incomplete information. A static game is a generalization of a discrete choice model, such as a multinomial logit or probit, which allows the actions of a group of agents to be interdependent. Unlike most earlier work, the method we propose is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013230815

Investment Busts, Reputation, and the Temptation to Blend in with the Crowd

Grenadier, Steven R. - 2014

We provide a dynamic model of an industry in which agents strategically time liquidation decisions in an effort to protect their reputations. As in traditional models, agents delay liquidation attempting to signal their quality. However, when the industry faces a common shock that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066308

The Limits of Meritocracy : Screening Bureaucrats Under Imperfect Verifiability

Suárez Serrato, Juan Carlos - 2016

Does bureaucratic ability predict promotion in governments? We show that self-reported performance in enforcing the One Child Policy predicts mayoral promotion in China. However, misreporting handicaps screening—a non-manipulated performance measure does not predict promotion. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012999457

Bayesian Persuasion

Kamenica, Emir - 2009

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153918

Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds

Caselli, Francesco - 2012

types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because …. Second, voters can exploit the signalling behavior of politicians by precommitting to a higher threshold for signals received …. Raising the threshold discourages signalling effort by low quality politicians but encourages effort by high quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013110929

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