in the depth and breadth of capital markets can be explained by a combination of the existence of deposit insurance and … empirical evidence showing that countries with explicit deposit insurance and a high degree of state-owned bank assets have …

-institution risk-shifting in recent years. Our method traverses two steps. The first step estimates leverage, return volatility, and …

Hooks and Robinson argue that moral hazard induced by deposit insurance induced banks to invest in riskier assets in … officers, which increases when insurance reduces depositors' incentives to monitor and react to the safety and soundness of …

Eight states established deposit insurance systems between 1908 and 1917. All abandoned the systems between 1921 and … Reserve Board of Governors demonstrate that deposit insurance influenced the composition of bank suspensions in these states …

trade off between risk and return. Banks may mitigate the resultant excessive risk by costly monitoring, where greater risk … reduction requires more resources devoted to risk supervision. Hence, the excessive risk associated with moral hazard is … endogenously determined. We show that a drop in banks' cost of funds increases the risk tolerated by banks in a competitive …

worsen, debt induces firms to risk-shift; this limits their funding liquidity and their ability to roll over debt. Firms may …

We study rollover risk and collateral value in a dynamic asset pricing model with endogenous debt financing by … borrowers face rollover risk if the belief dispersion between the borrowers and the pessimistic lenders widens after interim bad … presence of the rollover risk. We also highlight the role of interim trading which, by allowing creditors to sell seized …