; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can …

We augment the multi-market collusion model of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) by allowing for firm entry into, and exit … from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive … agreement: Collusion at the extensive margin whereby firms collude by avoiding entry into each other's markets or territories …

collusion and greater market share for domestic firms during periods of low demand as a result. This occurs in spite of the fact …

manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared to RPM or to the absence of such restrictions …

(used by Facebook). We find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP …

century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines …. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted … to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will …

A supergame theoretic price-setting model of collusion is calibrated to data from the North American passenger car …

Though economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that … it is detected. We propose a theory of "equilibrium price cutting and business stealing" in cartels to bridge this gap … between theory and observation …

We present a theory of collusive pricing in markets subject to business cycle fluctuations. In the business cycle model …