Showing 1 - 10 of 542
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773127
Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763767
In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668
unusually low CEO turnover and rely on internal management promotions. Their managers exercise stock options faster than … managers of other firms. Cartel firms are large donors to political candidates. While our results are based only upon firms … engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085128
both managers and firms, and affects the contractual relationships between those parties in important ways. Assessment (or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963757
Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159958
This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774941
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861
CEOs of public companies have influence over the political spending of their firms, which has been attracting significant attention since the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United. Furthermore, the policy views expressed by CEOs receive substantial consideration from policymakers and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012871142
A manager's shareholders, board of directors, and potential future employers are continually assessing his ability. A rich literature has documented that this insight has profound implications for corporate governance because assessment generates incentives (good and bad), introduces assorted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055514