The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

cash flow retention, more CEO accountability, and less earnings management. We posit that more powerful independent … errant top managers, or both …

an information ea between management and outside shareholders. In the presence of such a gap, maximizing short-run and … long-run stock prices are not the same thing. Management may be able to raise current stock prices by undertaking certain … actions that will reduce long-run value. In such a case, management faces the dilemma of which shareholders to please: those …

excess leverage, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, negative welfare effects of transparency, excess …