Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 308
Cover Image
Perceived FOMC : The Making of Hawks, Doves and Swingers
Bordo, Michael D. - 2018
Narrative records in US newspapers reveal that about 70 percent of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members who served during the last 55 years are perceived to have had persistent policy preferences over time, as either inflation-fighting hawks or growth-promoting doves. The rest are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012918077
Cover Image
What Do Boards Really Do? Evidence from Minutes of Board Meetings
Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam - 2011
We analyze a unique database from a sample of real-world boardrooms - minutes of board meetings and board-committee meetings of eleven business companies for which the Israeli government holds a substantial equity interest. We use these data to evaluate the underlying assumptions and predictions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119600
Cover Image
Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending
Kroszner, Randall - 2001
This paper investigates the frequency of connections between banks and non-financial firms through board linkages and whether those connections affect lending and borrowing behavior. Although a board linkages may reduce the costs of information flows between the lender and borrower, a board...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787534
Cover Image
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2009
decisions, directors' superior information, bargaining by management, pressures on managers to focus on the short …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767824
Cover Image
Busy Directors : Strategic Interaction and Monitoring Synergies
Ljungqvist, Alexander - 2017
We derive conditions for when having a “busy” director on the board is harmful to shareholders and when it is beneficial. Our model allows directors to condition their monitoring choices on their co-directors' choices and to experience positive or negative monitoring synergies across firms....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012946482
Cover Image
Ceo-Board Dynamics
Graham, John R. - 2019
We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012867455
Cover Image
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S : Perceptions, Facts and Challenges
Kaplan, Steven N. - 2012
In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100668
Cover Image
Smokescreen : How Managers Behave When They Have Something to Hide
Artiga González, Tanja - 2013
unusually low CEO turnover and rely on internal management promotions. Their managers exercise stock options faster than … managers of other firms. Cartel firms are large donors to political candidates. While our results are based only upon firms … engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085128
Cover Image
Assessing Managerial Ability : Implications for Corporate Governance
Hermalin, Benjamin E. - 2017
both managers and firms, and affects the contractual relationships between those parties in important ways. Assessment (or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963757
Cover Image
The Limitations of Stock Market Efficiency : Price Informativeness and CEO Turnover
Gorton, Gary B. - 2009
Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159958