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Image Versus Information : Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy
Ali, S. Nageeb - 2016
We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993235
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Misperceptions, Moral Hazard, and Incentives in Groups
Gaynor, Martin - 2021
Recent work has shown that, in the presence of moral hazard, balanced budget Nash equilibria in groups are not pareto-optimal. This work shows that when agents misperceive the effects of their actions on the joint outcome, there exist a set of sharing rules which balance the budget and lead to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013248428
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Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices
Buffa, Andrea M - 2014
We derive equilibrium asset prices when fund managers deviate from benchmark indices to exploit noise-trader induced distortions but fund investors constrain these deviations. Because constraints force managers to buy assets that they underweight when these assets appreciate, overvalued assets...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047402
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Motivating Effort in Contributing to Public Goods Inside Organizations : Field Experimental Evidence
Blasco, Andrea - 2016
We investigate the factors driving workers' decisions to generate public goods inside an organization through a randomized solicitation of workplace improvement proposals in a medical center with 1200 employees. We find that pecuniary incentives, such as winning a prize, generate a threefold...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993841
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On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments : Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments
List, John A. - 2014
Both private and public organizations constantly grapple with incentive schemes to induce maximum effort from agents. We begin with a theoretical exploration of optimal contest design, focusing on the number of competitors. Our theory reveals a critical link between the distribution of luck and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056205
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Opportunity Counts : Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives
Boning, Brent; Ichniowski, Casey; Shaw, Kathryn L. - 2021
This paper investigates the individual and joint effects of group incentive pay and problem-solving teams on productivity. To estimate models of adoption of these work practices and models of the effects of the work practices on productivity, we constructed a data set on the operations of 34...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240520
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Letting Down the Team? Evidence of Social Effects of Team Incentives
Babcock, Philip - 2011
This paper estimates social effects of incentivizing people in teams. In two field experiments featuring exogenous team … formation and opportunities for repeated social interactions, we find large team effects that operate through social channels …. The team compensation system induced agents to choose effort as if they valued a marginal dollar of compensation for their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013131446
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A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure
DeMarzo, Peter M. - 2010
We consider a principal-agent model in which the agent needs to raise capital from the principal to finance a project. Our model is based on DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), except that the agent's cash flows are given by a Brownian motion with drift in continuous time. The difficulty in writing an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012762612
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Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information
Novaes, Walter - 2010
Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labeled bureaucratic' and inefficient. This paper argues that the thin line between efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012762815
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Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
Baker, George P. - 2010
Objective measures of performance are seldom perfect. In response, incentive contracts often include important subjective components that mitigate incentive distortions caused by imperfect objective measures. This paper explores the combined use of subjective and objective performance measures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763277