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We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012867455
This paper surveys the economic literature on boards of directors. Although a legal requirement for many organizations, boards are also an endogenously determined governance mechanism for addressing agency problems inherent to many organizations. Formal theory on boards of directors has been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232428
We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low "frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107519
We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085052
Managerial delegation is essential for firm growth. While firms in poor countries often shun outside managers and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000531
Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038902
Using a unique 10-year panel that includes more than 13,300 expected stock market return probability distributions, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are too narrow: realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773122
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012773127
In this article, we focus on how recent research advances can be used to address the following six questions: (1) How much does executive compensation cost the firm? (2) How much is executive compensation worth to the recipient? (3) How well does executive compensation work? (4) What are the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012787508
learning algorithm. The algorithm uncovers two distinct behavioral types: “leaders” and “managers”. Leaders focus on multi …-function, high-level meetings, while managers focus on one-to-one meetings with core functions. Firms with leader CEOs are on average …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960702