Showing 1 - 10 of 295
an information ea between management and outside shareholders. In the presence of such a gap, maximizing short-run and … actions that will reduce long-run value. In such a case, management faces the dilemma of which shareholders to please: those … long-run stock prices are not the same thing. Management may be able to raise current stock prices by undertaking certain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115409
work on shareholders and shareholder activism, directors, executives and their compensation, controlling shareholders …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134144
aggregation for corporate risk-taking and investment. Market imperfections cause controlling shareholders to invest too much in … shareholders' collective attempts to boost shareholder value of individual firms leads to a novel pecuniary externality that … excess leverage, agency conflicts between shareholders and managers, negative welfare effects of transparency, excess …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955940
wealth maximization derived from shareholders' status as residual claimants are vulnerable on several fronts. Share … quasirents, expected earnings beyond expected costs of capital from investors, to which shareholders have no obvious claim. Other … made firm-specific investments, may exert stronger claims than atomistic public shareholders have to shares of their firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954931
We test the empirical validity of a claim that has been playing a central role in debates on corporate governance—the claim that interventions by activist hedge funds have a negative effect on the long-term shareholder value and corporate performance. We subject this claim to a comprehensive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021492
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861
We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111307
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting approach to executive compensation, which has dominated academic re-search on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013233722
This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135406
GIM Index or the proportion of activist shareholders. Following these special meetings, we find that the next quarter … following good firm performance or a desire to reward management for good past performance. Overall, our evidence seems more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037964