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This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the "hired gun" mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125564
People respond to those who ask. Within the charitable fundraising community, the power of the ask represents the … backbone of most fundraising strategies. Despite this, the optimal design of communication strategies has received less formal … attention. For their part, economists have recently explored how communication affects empathy, altruism, and giving rates to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013072578
We empirically test an information economics based theory of social preferences in which ego utility and self … a large price discount for the good. The combined evidence supports the self-signaling theory whereby price discounts … crowd out a consumer's self-inference of altruism from buying a good bundled with a charitable donation. Alternative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013017093
private or government hospitals. Extending our model to include patient heterogeneity and impure altruism (rivalry) provides a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014075329
As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130977
It has been previously shown that for sufficiently large pools of patient-donor pairs, (almost) efficient kidney exchange can be achieved by using at most 3-way cycles, i.e. by using cycles among no more than 3 patient-donor pairs. However, as kidney exchange has grown in practice, cycles among...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104082
Waitlists are often used to ration scarce resources, but the trade-offs in designing these mechanisms depend on agents preferences. We study equilibrium allocations under alternative designs for the deceased donor kidney waitlist. We model the decision to accept an organ or wait for a preferable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891330
Legislation and public policies are often the result of competition and compromise between different views and interests. In several cases, strongly held moral beliefs voiced by societal groups lead lawmakers to prohibit certain transactions or to prevent them from occurring through markets....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891786
In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sonmez, and Unver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013237035
For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposed algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289109