Collateral constraints widely used in models of financial crises feature a pecuniary externality: Agents do not internalize how borrowing decisions taken in “good times” affect collateral prices during a crisis. We show that agents in a competitive equilibrium borrow more than a financial...

"Liability dollarization,'' namely intermediation of capital inflows in units of tradables into domestic loans in units of aggregate consumption, adds three important effects driven by real-exchange-rate fluctuations that alter standard models of Sudden Stops significantly: Changes on the debt...

We have entered a world of conjoined monetary and macroprudential policies. But can they function smoothly in tandem, and with what effects? Since this policy cocktail has not been seen for decades, the empirical evidence is almost non-existent. We can only fix this shortcoming in a historical...

The massive expansion of central-bank balance sheets in response to recent crises raises important questions about the effects of such "quantitative easing" policies, both their effects on financial conditions and on aggregate demand (the intended effects of the policies), and their possible...

We provide a comprehensive account of the dynamics of eurozone countries from 2000 to 2012. We analyze private leverage, fiscal policy, labor costs and interest rates and we propose a strategy to separate the impact of credit cycles, excessive government spending, and sudden stops. We then ask...

“Leaning against the wind” (LAW), that is, tighter monetary policy for financial-stability purposes, has costs in terms of a weaker economy with higher unemployment and lower inflation and possible benefits from a lower probability or magnitude of a (financial) crisis. A first obvious cost...

We ask whether recent changes in monetary policy due to the financial crisis will be temporary or permanent. We present evidence from two surveys—one of central bank governors, the other of academic specialists. We find that central banks in crisis countries are more likely to have resorted to...

We develop a model of banking crises which Is consistent with two important features of the data: First, banking crises are usually preceded by credit booms. Second, credit booms often do not result in a crisis. That is, there are "good" booms as well as "bad" booms in the language of Gorton and...

We analyze how regulatory constraints on household leverage—in the form of loan-to-income and loan-to-value limits—affect residential mortgage credit and house prices as well as other asset classes not directly targeted by the limits. Supervisory loan level data suggest that mortgage credit...