Although nation-based systems of financial regulation constitute a second-best approach to global welfare maximization, treacherous accountability problems must be acknowledged and resolved before regulatory cooperation can deal fairly and efficiently with cross-border issues. To track and...

We study a modification of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model in which the bank may hold a liquid asset, some depositors see sunspots that could lead them to run, and all depositors have incomplete information about the bank's ability to survive a run. The incomplete information means that the...

We investigate the origins and growth of the Financial Stability Mandate (FSM) to examine why bank supervisors, inside and outside of central banks succeeded or failed to meet their FSM. Three issues inform this study: (1) what drives changes in the FSM, (2) whether supervision should be...

This paper examines macroprudential policies in open emerging economies. It discusses how the recent financial crisis has provided a rationale for macroprudential policies to help manage the economy and the need for policymakers to monitor the financial cycle and systemic risks. It also...

Can macroprudential foreign exchange (FX) regulations on banks reduce the financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities created by borrowing in foreign currency? To evaluate the effectiveness and unintended consequences of macroprudential FX regulations, we develop a parsimonious model of bank and...

We analyze a variant of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model of banking in which savers can use a bank to invest in a risky project operated by an entrepreneur. The savers can buy equity in the bank and save via deposits. The bank chooses to invest in a safe asset or to fund the entrepreneur. The...

Domestic prudential regulation can have unintended effects across borders and may be less effective in an environment where banks operate globally. Using U.S. micro-banking data for the first quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2013, this study shows that some regulatory changes indeed...

Financial safety nets are incomplete social contracts that assign responsibility to various economic sectors for preventing, detecting, and paying for potentially crippling losses at financial institutions. This paper uses the theories of incomplete contracts and sequential bargaining to...

As financial institutions and markets transact more and more cross-border business, gaps and flaws in national safety nets become more consequential. Because citizens of host (home) countries may be made to pay for mistakes made in the home (host) country, Basel's lead-regulator paradigm...

Under the New Basel Accord bank capital adequacy rules (Pillar 1) are substantially revised but the introduction of two new quot;Pillarsquot; is, perhaps, of even greater significance. This paper focuses on Pillar 2 which expands the range of instruments available to the regulator when...