. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …

competitive industries, the negative relation between past returns and current leverage will be attenuated. Theory suggests that … distinguish firms in less competitive industries and data for 165 single business firms in the U.S.A., we provide empirical …

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …

Managerial delegation is essential for firm growth. While firms in poor countries often shun outside managers and …

the executive. Agency theory remains the only viable candidate for answering the question about how executive compensation … compensation, in the context of agency theory. We suggest two fertile areas for research regarding the improvement of executive …

. Formal theory on boards of directors has been quite limited to this point. Most empirical work on boards has been aimed at … answering one of three questions: 1) How are board characteristics such as composition or size related to profitability? 2) How …