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Benefits of Control, Managerial Ownership, and the Stock Returns of Acquiring Firms
Hubbard, R. Glenn - 2008
This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012774941
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Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks : National Banks in the 1890s
Calomiris, Charles W. - 2014
Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060693
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The Effect of Liquidity on Governance
Edmans, Alex - 2011
disposal. Since the threat of governance, not just actual governance, can discipline managers, we use Section 13 filings to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013118841
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Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors, and Corporate Governance
Khanna, Tarun - 2010
We examine the interaction between three kinds of concentrated owners commonly found in an emerging market: family-run business groups, domestic financial institutions, and foreign financial institutions. Using data from India in the early 1990s, we find evidence that domestic international...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763811
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Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable Challenge
Becker, Bo - 2012
We use the Business Roundtable's challenge to the SEC's 2010 proxy access rule as a natural experiment to measure the value of shareholder proxy access. We find that firms that would have been most vulnerable to proxy access, as measured by institutional ownership and activist institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111307
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Measuring Institutional Investors’ Skill from Their Investments in Private Equity
Cavagnaro, Daniel - 2016
Using a large sample of institutional investors' private equity investments in venture and buyout funds, we estimate the extent to which investors' skill affects returns from private equity investments. We first consider whether investors have differential skill by comparing the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984744
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Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism
Morck, Randall - 2010
Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136737
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Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing
Albuquerque, Rui A. - 2010
The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759940
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Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations
Laeven, Luc - 2010
The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760554
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Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity : the Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights
Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2010
This paper examines common arrangements for separating control from cash flow rights: stock pyramids, cross-ownership structures, and dual class equity structures. We describe the ways in which such arrangements enable a controlling shareholder or group to maintain a complete lock on the control...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763575