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Natural Openness and Good Government
Wei, Shang-Jin - 2021
This paper offers a new interpretation of the connection between openness and good governance. Assuming that corruption … display lower corruption in equilibrium. In data, naturally more open economies' do exhibit less corruption even after taking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212346
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The Dictator's Inner Circle
Francois, Patrick - 2014
We posit the problem of an autocrat who has to allocate access to the executive positions in his inner circle and define the career profile of his own insiders. Statically, granting access to an executive post to a more experienced subordinate increases political returns to the post, but is more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052502
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Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
Alesina, Alberto F.; Tabellini, Guido - 2021
Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal polices, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240582
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Isolated Capital Cities and Misgovernance : Theory and Evidence
Campante, Filipe R. - 2013
city inhabitants, and lower levels of military spending by ruling elites, as predicted by the theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082160
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The Demand for Bad Policy When Voters Underappreciate Equilibrium Effects
Dal Bo, Ernesto - 2016
Although most of the political-economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or politicians' motives to supply bad policy, voters may themselves be partially responsible by demanding bad policy. In this paper, we posit that voters may systematically err when assessing potential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012977628
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Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. - 2021
We construct a simple model where political elites may block technological and institutional development, because of a 'political replacement effect'. Innovations often erode elites' incumbency advantage, increasing the likelihood that they will be replaced. Fearing replacement, political elites...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246644
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Embezzlement Versus Bribery
Fan, C. Simon - 2010
Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the state budget--embezzling or misspending funds--or they can demand extra payments from citizens in return for services--bribery. In many circumstances, embezzlement is less distortionary than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013135875
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Democracy Undone. Systematic Minority Advantage in Competitive Vote Markets
Casella, Alessandra - 2012
We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097274
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Corruption
Banerjee, Abhijit V. - 2012
In this paper, we provide a new framework for analyzing corruption in public bureaucracies. The standard way to model … corruption is as an example of moral hazard, which then leads to a focus on better monitoring and stricter penalties with the … eradication of corruption as the final goal. We propose an alternative approach which emphasizes why corruption arises in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108004
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Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-Blowing : A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
Chassang, Sylvain - 2014
possible to establish robust bounds on equilibrium corruption using only non-verifiable reports. Our analysis suggests a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013050290