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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951861

Credit Default Swaps, Agency Problems, and Management Incentives

Lee, Jongsub - 2017

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941985

How Do Quasi-Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk-Taking?

Shue, Kelly - 2019

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk-taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk-averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multi-year compensation plans, which generate two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902373

Growth Through Rigidity : An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay

Shue, Kelly - 2018

The dramatic rise in CEO compensation during the 1990s and early 2000s is a longstanding puzzle. In this paper, we show that much of the rise can be explained by a tendency of firms to grant the same number of options each year. Number-rigidity implies that the grant-date value of option awards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936509

Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia

Edmans, Alex - 2014

to introduce a new empirical measure that is tightly linked to theory - the sensitivity of equity vesting over the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063030

The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options

Hall, Brian J. - 2010

Detailed data about stock option contracts are used to measure and analyze the pay to performance incentives of executive stock options. Two main issues are addressed. The first is the pay to performance incentives created by the revaluation of stock option holdings. The findings suggest that if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763587

CEO Incentives and Firm Size

Baker, George P.; Hall, Brian J. - 2021

What determines CEO incentives? A confusion exists among both academics and practitioners about how to measure the strength of CEO incentives, and how to reconcile the enormous differences in pay sensitivities between executives in large and small firms. We show that while one measure of CEO...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013234372

Executive Compensation : A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023343

Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation

Graham, John R. - 2011

We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time invariant firm and especially manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120991

Seeking Alpha : Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent

Acharya, Viral V. - 2013

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085052

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