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Bebchuk, Lucian A.; Ben-Shahar, Omri - 2021

. Investments in reliance will be socially suboptimal in the absence of any pre-contractual liability -- and will be socially … excessive under strict liability for all reliance expenditures. Given the results for these polar cases, we focus on exploring … how 'intermediate' liability rules could be best designed to induce efficient reliance decisions. One of our results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220927

Contracting in the Shadow of the Law

Chakravarty, Surajeet - 2010

Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations based on verifiable events (corresponding to the legal rule of specific performance). As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question of optimal contract design given the available remedies used...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759362

Dynamic Supplier Contracts under Asymmetric Inventory Information

Zhang, Hao; Nagarajan, Mahesh; Sosic, Greys - 2010

In this paper, we examine a supply chain in which a single supplier sells to a downstream newsvendor-type retailer. We make two assumptions that enrich this simple and well-understood model. First, we consider a multi-period model, in which the sequence of events is as follows. In a period, t,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047671

Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium

Guerrieri, Veronica; Shimer, Robert; Wright, Randall D. - 2021

We extend the concept of competitive search equilibrium to environments with private information, and in particular adverse selection. Principals (e.g. employers or agents who want to buy assets) post contracts, which we model as revelation mechanisms. Agents (e.g. workers, or asset holders)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235346

The Insurance is the Lemon : Failing to Index Contracts

Hartman-Glaser, Barney - 2019

We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894992

Persistent Private Information

Williams, Noah - 2008

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents have private information that is persistent. In particular, I focus on a continuous time version of a benchmark insurance problem where a risk averse agent would like to borrow from a risk neutral lender to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012772314

Equilibrium in a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection with Endogenous Information

Stiglitz, Joseph E. - 2017

This paper investigates the existence and nature of equilibrium in a competitive insurance market under adverse selection with endogenously determined information structures. Rothschild-Stiglitz (RS) characterized the self-selection equilibrium under the assumption of exclusivity, enforcement of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012953019

A Contracting-Theory Interpretation of the Origins of Federal Deposit Insurance

Kane, Edward J. - 2010

liability provisions in controlling incentive conflict among large bank stakeholders. Federal deposit insurance restored …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763615

Contracts as Reference Points - Experimental Evidence

Fehr, Ernst - 2010

In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore's notion that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012758135

Repurchase Options in the Market for Lemons

Bigio, Saki; Shi, Liyan - 2022

We study repurchase options (repo contracts) in a competitive asset market with asymmetric information. Gains from trade emerge from a liquidity need, but private information about asset quality prevents the full realization of trade. We obtain a unique equilibrium, which features a pooling repo...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014244252