China's investment rate is one of the highest in the world, which naturally leads one to suspect that the return to capital in China must be quite low. Using the data from China's national accounts, we estimate the rate of return to capital in China. We find that the aggregate rate of return to...

Chinese local governments wield their enormous political power and administrative capacity to provide “special deals” for favored private firms. We argue that China's extraordinary economic growth comes from these special deals. Local political leaders do so because they derive personal...

In 2009 and 2010, China undertook a 4 trillion Yuan fiscal stimulus, roughly equivalent to 12 percent of annual GDP. The "fiscal" stimulus was largely financed by off-balance sheet companies (local financing vehicles) that borrowed and spent on behalf of local governments. The off-balance sheet...

We use administrative registration records with information on the owners of all Chinese firms to document their connections through equity investments. We show that the largest private owners have direct equity ties with state owners, the next largest private owners have equity ties with...

Bureaucratic quality in terms of the level of corruption varies widely across countries, and is in general slow to evolve relative to the speed with which many economic polices can be implemented such as the imposition of capital controls. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of...