An important aspect of corporate governance is the assessment of managers. When managers vary in ability, determining …? This paper begins an exploration of that issue by considering the consequence of one such bias, the base-rate fallacy, for … due to the base-rate fallacy, they can also benefit from this bias …

"frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a … reporting errors. Further, cultural changes associated with an increase in fraud risk are more likely during unfrugal (vs …

. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for managers and demonstrate that the use of high-powered incentives will be … limited by the need to soften product market competition. In particular, when managers can be compensated based on their own …

The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …

We develop a model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an … bribes to some division managers. And because headquarters is itself an agent of outside investors, the bribes may take the …

through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …