Showing 1 - 10 of 317
We investigate how criminal organizations strategically use violence to influence elections in order to get captured … politicians elected. The model offers novel testable implications about the use of pre-electoral violence under different types of … rates in Italy since 1887, comparing the extent of ‘electoral-violence cycles' between areas with a higher and lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996383
The contemporary approach to political economy is built around vested interests - elites, lobbies, and rent-seeking groups which get their way at the expense of the general public. The role of ideas in shaping those interests is typically ignored or downplayed. Yet each of the three components...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013073185
We propose a new model of legislative bargaining in which coalitions have different values, reflecting the fact that the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890469
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or informational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097778
anti-corruption enforcement affect the expected quality of governance through candidate self-selection. We also show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038435
Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world's societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001771
The Ku Klux Klan reached its heyday in the mid-1920s, claiming millions of members. In this paper, we analyze the 1920s Klan, those who joined it, and the social and political impact that it had. We utilize a wide range of newly discovered data sources including information from Klan membership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759820
Weak states enable private enforcement but it does not always fade away in the presence of strong states. We develop a general equilibrium model of the market organization of enforcers (self-enforcers, competitive specialized enforcers or monopoly) who defend endowments from predators. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013215342
Why does illegal trade often flourish without formal enforcement, but sometimes fail? Why do illegal trade-reducing policies often fail? Why do States often appear to tolerate illegal trade? A model of trade with cops and robbers provides answers. `Safety in numbers' is a key element: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245087
Canonical models of crime emphasize economic incentives. Yet, causal evidence of sorting into criminal occupations in response to individual-level variation in incentives is limited. We link administrative socioeconomic microdata with the universe of arrests in Medellín over a decade. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012863694