We analyze consequences of changing the terms of trade between agriculture and industry on capital accumulation and on welfare of workers in different sectors. The issue was central to Soviet industrialization debate and it remains important in today's developing world. Through a simple general...

This paper presents some new perspectives on the structure and performance of alternative economic organizations. We posit that decision makers make errors of judgement (for example, they sometimes select bad projects while rejecting good projects), and that how these errors are aggregated...

This paper develops a general methodology for analyzing shadow wage (and other shadow prices). Our approach is to identify those reduced form relationships describing the economy which are central to the determination of the shadow wage, and use these to obtain simple formulae for the shadow...

Thi spaper presents certain remarkably simple results concerning market's allocation to R&D and its comparison to socially efficient allocations. We posit that a firm can undertake more than one project aimed at the same innovation, and consider a product market characterized by Bertrand...

This paper presents an analysis of price reform and of optimal pricing and taxation of agricultural and industrial goods in modern-day LDCs. Our analysis is based on a general equilibrium paradigm with a multitude of goods and income groups. It is consistent with several alternative...

This paper analyzes optimal and equilibrium insurance contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard, comparing them with those under a single informational asymmetry. The complex interactions of self-selection and moral hazard constraints have important consequences. We develop an analytic...

This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies types of market failure. Each of the...

Firms' inability to monitor their employees' search effort forces a tradeoff between risk-bearing and incentive considerations when designing employment-related insurance. Since the provision of insurance against firm-specific shocks adversely affects workers' incentives to find better jobs, the...

This paper examines the existence and nature of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard. The more insurance an individual has, the less care will he take. Consequently, insurance firms attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. If individuals' aggregate insurance...

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program through an individual account, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving their search incentives...