This paper provides an empirical analysis of the risk of trading revenues of U.S. commercial banks. We collect quarterly data on trading revenues, broken down by business line, as well as the Value at Risk-based market risk charge. The overall picture from these preliminary results is that there...

Recent research shows that emerging markets are distinguished by high returns and low covariances with global market factors. These are striking results because of their immediate implications for the international investor. One key issue is whether these results may be attributed to recent...

The expected return on equity capital is possibly the most important driving factor in asset allocation decisions. Yet, the long-term estimates we typically use are derived from U.S. data only. There are reasons to suspect, however, that these estimates of return on capital are subject to...

This paper was an accidental re-issue of <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w5901">w5901</a>

Recent empirical work indicates that, in a variety of financial markets, both conditional expectations and conditional variances of returns are time- varying. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether these joint fluctuations of conditional first and second moments are consistent with...

This paper provides two alternative estimation and testing procedures of a representative-agent model of asset pricing which relies on a particular parametrization of non-expected-utility preferences. The first is based on maximum-likelihood estimates, supplemented with an explicit model of time...

This paper extends previous work on the information in the term structure at longer maturities to other countries besides the United states, using a newly constructed data set for 1 to 5 year interest rates from Britain, West Germany and Switzerland. Even with wide differences in inflation...

Empirical research on executive compensation has focused almost exclusively on the incentives provided to chief executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution of incentives and responsibilities for other members of...

Do firms systematically over- or underinvest as a result of agency problems? We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers have private benefits or private costs of investment. Managers overinvest when they have private benefits and underinvest when they have...

We argue that strategic interactions between firms in an oligopoly can explain the puzzling lack of high-powered incentives in executive compensation contracts written by shareholders whose objective is to maximize the value of their shares. We derive the optimal compensation contracts for...