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Fiscal Federalism and Legislative Malapportionment: Causal Evidence from Independent but Related Natural Experiments
Galiani, Sebastian; Torre, Iván; Torrens, Gustavo - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014
We exploit three natural experiments in Argentina in order to study the role of legislative malapportionment on the biased federal tax sharing scheme prevalent in the country. We do not find support to attribute it to legislative malapportionment during periods when democratic governments were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969273
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The Need for Enemies
Robinson, James Alan; Torvik, Ragnar; Fergusson, Leopoldo; … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012
We develop a political economy model where some politicians have a comparative advantage in undertaking a task and this gives them an electoral advantage. This creates an incentive to underperform in the task in order to maintain their advantage. We interpret the model in the context of fighting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969281
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Does Conflict of Interest Lead to Biased Coverage? Evidence from Movie Reviews
DellaVigna, Stefano; Hermle, Johannes - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014
Media outlets are increasingly owned by conglomerates, inducing a conflict of interest: a media outlet can bias its coverage to benefit companies in the same group. We test for bias by examining movie reviews by media outlets owned by News Corp.—such as the Wall Street Journal—and by Time...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969306
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Left, Right, Left: Income, Learning and Political Dynamics
Morrow, John; Carter, Michael - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
more, challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior. This paper generalizes the forward-looking voter …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950705
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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
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Chiefs: Elite Control of Civil Society and Economic Development in Sierra Leone
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James Alan; Reed, Tristan - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
The lowest level of government in sub-Saharan Africa is often a cadre of chiefs who raise taxes, control the judicial system and allocate the most important scarce resource - land. Chiefs, empowered by colonial indirect rule, are often accused of using their power despotically and inhibiting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950719
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Turnout Across Democracies
Morelli, Massimo; Herrera, Helios; Nunnari, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014
on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences for the competing parties. In particular, we uncover a … novel contest effect: given the distribution of preferences, turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more … proportional to a less proportional system; turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of proportionality. Moreover, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950738
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Politics 2.0: The Multifaceted Effect of Broadband Internet on Political Participation
Campante, Filipe R.; Durante, Ruben; Sobbrio, Francesco - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
on turnout in national elections, driven by increased abstention of ideologically extreme voters. Meanwhile, however …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950872
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Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts
spiller, pablo t.; Moszoro, Marian W. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012
The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950960
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Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model
Acemoglu, Daron; Wolitzky, Alexander - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012
We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951006