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You Owe Me
Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012
In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without incentive or informational effects, small gifts strongly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951405
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The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2005
probability and magnitude of sanctions; corruption; incapacitation; costly observation of wealth; social norms; and the fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014923
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Cultures of Corruption: Evidence From Diplomatic Parking Tickets
Miguel, Edward Andrew; Fisman, Raymond - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006
Corruption is believed to be a major factor impeding economic development, but the importance of legal enforcement … versus cultural norms in controlling corruption is poorly understood. To disentangle these two factors, we exploit a natural … experiment, the stationing of thousands of diplomats from around the world in New York City. Diplomatic immunity means there was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720647
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The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable
Polinsky, A. Mitchell - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2004
This article studies the optimal use of fines and imprisonment when an offender's level of wealth is private information that cannot be observed by the enforcement authority. In a model in which there are two levels of wealth, I derive the optimal mix of sanctions, including the imprisonment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005580013
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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
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Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences
Kaplow, Louis - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008
Optimal policy rules--including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities … preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005084879
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Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
Roth, Alvin - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006
This essay examines how repugnance sometimes constrains what transactions and markets we see. When my colleagues and I have helped design markets and allocation procedures, we have often found that distaste for certain kinds of transactions is a real constraint, every bit as real as the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005049997
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Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation
Kaplow, Louis - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006
A substantial literature examines second-best environmental policy, focusing particularly on how the Pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation. Additional literature is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005575754
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How Did Distributional Preferences Change During the Great Recession?
Fisman, Raymond; Jakiela, Pamela; Kariv, Shachar - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014
We compare behavior in experiments measuring distributional preferences during the "Great Recession" to behavior in identical experiments conducted during the preceding economic boom. Subjects are drawn from a diverse pool of students whose socioeconomic composition is largely held constant by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951431
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Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing: a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports
Chassang, Sylvain; Miquel, Gerard Padró i - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014
possible to establish robust bounds on equilibrium corruption using only non-verifiable reports. Our analysis suggests a simple …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969268