We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these...

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first-price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends...

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...

We examine the mechanics of deterrence and intervention when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different assessments of their...

Linear RE models typically possess a multiplicity of solutions. Consider, however, the requirement that the solution coefficients must not be infinitely discontinuous in the model's structural parameters. In particular, we require that the solutions should be continuous in the limit as those...

We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. The choice is binary and the number of supporters of either alternative is known. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of...

Recent mainstream monetary policy analysis focuses on rational expectation solutions that are uniquely stable. A number of recent studies have examined the question of whether typical New Keynesian (NK) models, with policy rules that satisfy the Taylor principle, also exhibit solutions with...

It is argued that learnability/E-stability is a necessary condition for a RE solution to be plausible. A class of linear models considered by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) is shown to include all models of the form used by King and Watson (1998) and Klein (2000), which permits any number of lags,...

We study the efficiency of oligopoly equilibria in congested markets. The motivating examples are the allocation of network flows in a communication network or of traffic in a transportation network. We show that increasing competition among oligopolists can reduce efficiency, measured as the...

Consider a rational expectations (RE) model that includes a relationship between variables x_t and z_t+1. To be considered structural and potentially useful as a guide to actual behavior, this model must specify whether x_t is influenced by the expectation at t of z_t+1 or, alternatively, that z_t+1...