Showing 1 - 10 of 300
This paper discusses the fundamental underpinnings and some implications of transaction cost regulation (TCR), a …. TCR sees regulation as the governance structure of these interactions, and thus, as in standard transaction cost economics … possible institutional alternative. In that sense, politics becomes fundamental to understanding regulation as the governance …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804668
Corruption is believed to be a major factor impeding economic development, but the importance of legal enforcement versus cultural norms in controlling corruption is poorly understood. To disentangle these two factors, we exploit a natural experiment, the stationing of thousands of diplomats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720647
Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have … antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign … record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774722
The goal of this paper is to examine the implied penalty policies underlying the remedies created by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in terms of the policies' impact on employer and union behaviors. We present a simple model of deterrence as a means of evaluating workplace penalty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764664
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969268
This paper examines if money matters in education by looking at whether missing resources due to corruption affect student outcomes. We use data from the auditing of Brazil's local governments to construct objective measures of corruption involving educational block grants transferred from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950699
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
Anti-poverty programs in developing countries are often difficult to implement; in particular, many governments lack the capacity to deliver payments securely to targeted beneficiaries. We evaluate the impact of biometrically-authenticated payments infrastructure ("Smartcards") on beneficiaries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950950
The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950960
We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability, and in contrast with the alternative hypothesis that it might forestall political capture. We then provide direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951032