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Political Economy in a Changing World
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
"single crossing" (increasing differences) conditions, we prove the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium, provide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950976
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A Political Theory of Populism
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011
When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses "populist' policies - i.e., policies to the left...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251515
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Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008
A central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision-making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions. For example, current constitutional change must take into account how the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005714421
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Coalition Formation in Political Games
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774462
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Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2009
dynamic evolution of governments and determine the structure of stable governments, which arise and persist in equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037696
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Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
Roth, Alvin - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007
The deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) has had a profound influence on market design, both directly, by being adapted into practical matching mechanisms, and, indirectly, by raising new theoretical questions. Deferred acceptance algorithms are at the basis of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005084488
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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
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A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars
Pakes, Ariel; Fershtman, Chaim - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 1999
Most of the theoretical work on collusion and price wars assumes identical firms and an unchanging environment, assumptions which are at odds with what we know about most industries. Further that literature focuses on the impact of collusion on prices. Whether an industry can support collusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777745
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Identification in Matching Games
Fox, Jeremy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2009
equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a production function, which gives the surplus from a match, are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005055406
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Estimating Matching Games with Transfers
Fox, Jeremy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008
equilibrium data on who matches with whom for semiparametric estimation of match production functions in many-to-many, two …-sided matching games with transferable utility. Inequalities derived from equilibrium necessary conditions underlie a maximum score … a matching market, as the estimator avoids solving for an equilibrium and estimating first-stage match probabilities. I …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037698