We characterize the strategic and corrective role for R&D subsidies in an export market where R&D is an uncertain process and where the winner of the R&D competition monopolizes the market. Investments in R&D are assumed to induce either first order or mean-preserving second order shifts in the...

We consider the effects of antidumping law when utilized by competitive domestic petitioners against a foreign monopolist. The foreign monopolist must set capacity before the realization of random foreign demand, but can reduce the cost of holding excess capacity in periods of slack foreign...

We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the...

The primary predictions of strategic-trade theory are not restricted to imperfectly-competitive markets. Indeed, these predictions emerge in a natural three-country extension of the traditional theory of trade policy in competitive markets, once the theory is augmented to allow for...

We evaluate the sensitivity of the case for an R&D subsidy in an export sector when the outcome of R&D is uncertain and when the resulting product market is oligopolistic. Investments in R&D are assumed to induce either first order or mean-preserving second order shifts in the distribution of a...

We test empirically for evidence that government tariff-setting behavior depends on the degree of discretion with which policy-makers are endowed. We do this by studying government tariff choices under two distinct environments. One environment is that of tariffs set under the Escape Clause...

We provide a simple but novel model of trade agreements that highlights the role of transaction costs, renegotiation and dispute settlement. The model allows us to characterize the appropriate remedy for breach and whether the agreement should be structured as a system of "property rights" or...

Existing theories of trade agreements suggest that GATT/WTO efforts to reign in export subsidies represent an inefficient victory for exporting governments that comes at the expense of importing governments. Building from the Cournot delocation model first introduced by Venables (1985), we...

We consider the purpose and design of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, GATT. We review recent developments in the relevant theoretical and empirical literature. And we describe the GATT/WTO architecture and briefly trace its historical antecedents. We suggest that the...

We consider the purpose and design of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive environments featuring firm-delocation effects. In both the segmented-market Cournot and the integrated-market monopolistic competition settings where these effects have been identified, we show that the only...