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Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets

Knittel, Christopher R.; Stango, Victor - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006

We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors' deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005828868

Antitrust

Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007

This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005049968

The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying

Kerr, William R.; Lincoln, William F.; Mishra, Prachi - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011

We study the determinants of the dynamics of firm lobbying behavior using a panel data set covering 1998-2006. Our data exhibit three striking facts: (i) few firms lobby, (ii) lobbying status is strongly associated with firm size, and (iii) lobbying status is highly persistent over time....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359896

Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707

Antitrust and Regulation

Carlton, Dennis W.; Picker, Randal C. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007

Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have … operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests … antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774722

Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's

Ashenfelter, Orley; Graddy, Kathryn - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2004

The Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034355

Factions and Political Competition

Persico, Nicola; Silverman, Dan; Rodríguez-Pueblita, … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007

This paper presents a new model of political competition where candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718155

Weak Versus Strong Net Neutrality

Gans, Joshua S. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014

providers. With this additional price it is demonstrated that the type of net neutrality regulation (i.e., weak versus strong … negative impact from such regulation on ISP investment. Counter to many claims, it is argued here that ISP competition may not … be a substitute for net neutrality regulation in bringing about these effects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821684

Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts

spiller, pablo t.; Moszoro, Marian W. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012

The lack of flexibility in public procurement design and implementation reflects public agents' political risk adaptation to limit hazards from opportunistic third parties - political opponents, competitors, interest groups - while externalizing the associated adaptation costs to the public at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950960

Private Returns to Public Office

Fisman, Raymond; Schulz, Florian; Vig, Vikrant - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012

We study the wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency comparison where both runner-up and winner...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011271399