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Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Levine, David; Modica, Salvatore - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950707
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Political Economy in a Changing World
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
We provide a general framework for the analysis of the dynamics of institutional change (e.g., democratization, extension of political rights or repression of different groups), and how these dynamics interact with (anticipated and unanticipated) changes in the distribution of political power...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950976
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A Political Theory of Populism
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2011
When voters fear that politicians may have a right-wing bias or that they may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of true left-wing conviction are valuable. As a consequence, even a moderate politician seeking reelection chooses "populist' policies - i.e., policies to the left...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251515
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Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008
A central feature of dynamic collective decision-making is that the rules that govern the procedures for future decision-making and the distribution of political power across players are determined by current decisions. For example, current constitutional change must take into account how the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005714421
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Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide Attacks
Berman, Eli; Laitin, David - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2005
Who chooses suicide attacks? Though rebels typically target poor countries, suicide attacks are just as likely to target rich democracies. Though many groups have grievances, suicide attacks are favored by the radical religious. Though rebels often kill coreligionists, they seldom use suicide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005829597
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Coalition Formation in Political Games
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2006
We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774462
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Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
Acemoglu, Daron; Sonin, Konstantin; Egorov, Georgy - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2009
. Perfect democracy, where current members of the government do not have an incumbency advantage or special powers, always leads … to the emergence of the most competent government. However, any deviation from perfect democracy destroys this result … least competent government can persist forever in office. Moreover, a greater degree of democracy may lead to worse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005037696
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Committee Structure and the Success of Connected Lending in Nineteenth Century New England Banks
Meissner, Christopher M. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2003
Early nineteenth century New England banking exhibited high levels of lending to directors and their associates (i.e., connected lending). Today many think this arrangement can lead to inefficiency and financial fragility. This paper explores the decision making processes inside these banks and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005777625
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Optimal Primaries
Holden, Richard; Hummel, Patrick - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
We analyze a model of US presidential primary elections for a given party. There are two candidates, one of whom is a higher quality candidate. Voters reside in m different states and receive noisy private information about the identity of the superior candidate. States vote in some order, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821672
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Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model
Acemoglu, Daron; Wolitzky, Alexander - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012
We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially play coordination games under incomplete information about whether the other side consists of "extremists" who will never take the good/trusting action. Good actions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951006