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Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from RMBS Market
Piskorski, Tomasz; Seru, Amit; Witkin, James - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2013
% higher when compared with otherwise similar loans. Lenders seem to be partly aware of this risk, charging a higher interest … not fully reflect their higher default risk. Using measures of pricing used in the literature, we find no evidence that … unrelated to measures of incentives for top management, to quality of risk management inside these firms or to regulatory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951222
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Repossession and the Democratization of Credit
Benmelech, Efraim; Assunção, Juliano J.; Silva, … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2012
We exploit a 2004 credit reform in Brazil that simplified the sale of repossessed cars used as collateral for auto loans. We show that the change has led to larger loans with lower spreads and longer maturities. The reform expanded credit to riskier, low-income borrowers for newer, more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652910
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Powerful Independent Directors
Morck, Randall; Fogel, Kathy; Ma, Liping - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2014
Shareholder valuations are economically and statistically positively correlated with more powerful independent directors, their power gauged by social network power centrality measures. Sudden deaths of powerful independent directors significantly reduce shareholder value, consistent with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951070
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Learning and the Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns
Bebchuk, Lucian; Cohen, Alma; Wang, Charles C.Y. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010
In an important and influential work, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) show that a trading strategy based on an index of 24 governance provisions (G-Index) would have earned abnormal returns during the 1991-1999 period, and this intriguing finding has attracted much attention ever since it was...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631671
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The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed?
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Low, Angie; Stulz, René M. - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2010
Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008631680
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Differences in Governance Practices between U.S. and Foreign Firms: Measurement, Causes, and Consequences
Aggarwal, Reena; Erel, Isil; Stulz, René; Williamson, Rohan - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007
Using an index which increases as a firm adopts more governance attributes, we find that 12.7% of foreign firms have a higher index than matching U.S. firms. The best predictor for whether a foreign firm adopts more governance attributes than a comparable U.S. firm is whether the firm comes from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720617
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Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?
Romano, Roberta - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2002
Confidential voting in corporate proxies is a principal recommendation in activist institutional investors' guidelines for corporate governance reforms. This paper examines the impact of the adoption of confidential voting on proposal outcomes through a panel data set of shareholder and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720678
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A Lobbying Approach to Evaluating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Sapienza, Paola; Hochberg, Yael V.; Vissing-Jorgensen, … - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007
We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005720926
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The Impact of Litigation on Venture Capitalist Reputation
Atanasov, Vladimir; Ivanov, Vladimir; Litvak, Kate - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2007
Venture capital contracts give VCs enormous power over entrepreneurs and early equity investors of portfolio companies. A large literature examines how these contractual terms protect VCs against misbehavior by entrepreneurs. But what constrains misbehavior by VCs? We provide the first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005829655
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Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth
Bebchuk, Lucian; Jolls, Christine - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2000
The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to themselves through a variety of mechanisms, such as self-dealing, insider trading, and taking of corporate opportunities. A common view in the law and economics literature is that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005774952