Showing 1 - 10 of 214
We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010969268
We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010885305
We develop a new theory of the firm where asset owners sometimes want to change partners ex-post. The model identifies a fundamental trade-off between (i) a "displacement externality" under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though the benefit is worth less than the loss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950631
We study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosyncratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. Actions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010951169
We study investment options in a dynamic agency model. Moral hazard creates an option to wait and agency conflicts affect the timing of investment. The model sheds light, theoretically and quantitatively, on the evolution of firms' dynamics, in particular the decline of the failure rate and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710340
This paper analyzes a model where investors use a credit rating to decide whether to finance a firm. The rating quality depends on the unobservable effort exerted by a credit rating agency (CRA). We analyze optimal compensation schemes for the CRA that differ depending on whether a social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796643
In this paper we analyze the problem of whether and/or when to replace a leader (agent) when no monetary rewards are available, and it is the leader's competence rather than effort that is being evaluated. The only decisions that the leader takes over time are whether to undertake risky but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010796728
Moral hazard is endemic to employment relationships and firms often use performance pay and managerial control to address this problem. While performance pay has received much empirical attention, managerial control has not. We analyze data from a managerial-control field experiment in which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010711815
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010821716
We characterize cost-minimizing interventions to restore lending and investment when markets fail due to adverse selection. We solve a mechanism design problem where the strategic decision to participate in a government's program signals information that affects the financing terms of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008624585