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Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar - In: The review of economic studies 80 (2013) 3, pp. 845-875

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010203296

The Political Economy of Indirect Control

Miquel, Gerard Padró i - 2010

This paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its … to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462907

Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing : a Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports

Chassang, Sylvain - 2014

We consider a game between a principal, an agent, and a monitor in which the principal would like to rely on messages by the monitor to target intervention against a misbehaving agent. The difficulty is that the agent can credibly threaten to retaliate against likely whistleblowers in the event...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458351

Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?

Acemoglu, Daron - 2011

Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461364

Cycles of Distrust : An Economic Model

Acemoglu, Daron - 2012

We propose a model of cycles of distrust and conflict. Overlapping generations of agents from two groups sequentially … a sequence of bad actions originated. Assuming that both sides are not extremists, spirals of distrust and conflict get … this mechanism can be useful in interpreting cycles of ethnic conflict and international war, and how it also emerges in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460403