Showing 1 - 10 of 57
This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014
In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724
A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011699204
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673357
We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions, and for any discount factor, we show that the unobservability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673489
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460
A standing question in the theory of matching markets is how to define stability under incomplete information. This … possible degree of rationality that can be ascribed to their proponents. A matching is deemed “stable” if maintaining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472497
This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464530
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599333
We argue that the rise of antidumping protection and the proliferation of voluntary export restraints are fundamentally inter-related. We show that both can be explained by a cost-based definition of dumping when the domestic government has incomplete information about the foreign firm's costs....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471822