This paper models a frictional labor market where employers endogenously discriminate against the long term unemployed. The estimated model replicates recent experimental evidence which documents that interview invitations for observationally equivalent workers fall sharply as unemployment...

In this paper, we survey non-competitive theories of training. With competitive labor markets, firms never pay for investments in general training, whereas when labor markets are imperfect, firm-sponsored training arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. We discuss a variety of evidence which...

In the standard model of human capital with perfect labor markets general training. When labor market frictions compress the structure of wages in the general skills of their employees. The reason is that the distortion in the wage structure" turn technologically' general skills into specific'...

This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive. The crucial ingredient in our model is that the current employer has superior information about the worker's ability relative to other firms. This informational advantage gives the...