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Takeover bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Bebchuk, Lucian - 2001

This paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded …) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination of proxy fights and takeover bids in which shareholders vote on … cash or the acquirer's existing securities, voting shareholders can infer from the pre-vote market trading which outcome …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470083

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, Alex - 2007

This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Gabaix, Xavier - 2006

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300

Firm Expansion and CEO Pay

Bebchuk, Lucian - 2005

We study the extent to which decisions to expand firm size are associated with increases in subsequent CEO compensation. Controlling for past stock performance, we find a positive correlation between CEO compensation and the CEO's past decisions to increase firm size. This correlation is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466785

The Growth of Executive Pay

Bebchuk, Lucian - 2005

This paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of U.S. executive pay during the period 1993-2003. During this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be explained by changes in firm size, performance and industry classification. Had the relationship of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467236

The Dynamics of Inequality

Gabaix, Xavier - 2015

in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457305

Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity : The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights

Bebchuk, Lucian - 1999

associated with controlling shareholders who hold a majority of the cash flow rights in their companies. The agency costs of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471856