Showing 1 - 10 of 11
CEOs of public companies have influence over the political spending of their firms, which has been attracting significant attention since the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United. Furthermore, the policy views expressed by CEOs receive substantial consideration from policymakers and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479765
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
Are the political preferences of CEOs associated with the representation and compensation of women in the executive suite? We find that Democratic CEOs (those who contribute more to Democratic candidates) are associated with higher representation of women in the executive suite. To explore...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585377
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326
This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300
in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457305
In an important and influential work, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) show that a trading strategy based on an index of 24 governance provisions (G-Index) would have earned abnormal returns during the 1991-1999 period, and this intriguing finding has attracted much attention ever since it was...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462740
protecting management from removal. A majority of U.S. public companies have staggered boards that substantially insulate the … staggered boards established in the corporate charter (which shareholders cannot amend) than for staggered boards established in … the company's bylaws (which can be amended by shareholders) …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468106