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Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives

Desai, Mihir A. - 2004

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468222

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, Alex - 2007

This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Gabaix, Xavier - 2006

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300

Earnings Manipulation and Managerial Investment Decisions : Evidence from Sponsored Pension Plans

Bergstresser, Daniel - 2004

Managers appear to manipulate firm earnings when they characterize pension assets to capital markets and alter … earnings to the assumed long-term rate of return on pension assets. Managers are more aggressive with assumed long-term rates … of return when their assumptions have a greater impact on reported earnings. Managers also increase assumed rates of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468150

The Dynamics of Inequality

Gabaix, Xavier - 2015

in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457305

Taxes, Institutions and Foreign Diversification Opportunities

Desai, Mihir A. - 2007

Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflect efforts to bypass home...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465522

Taxation and the Evolution of Aggregate Corporate Ownership Concentration

Desai, Mihir A. - 2005

Legal rules, politics and behavioral factors have all been emphasized as explanatory factors in analyses of the determinants of the concentration of corporate ownership and stock market participation. An extension of standard tax clientele arguments demonstrates that changes in the progressivity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467211