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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

CEO Pay and the rise of Relative Performance Contracts : A Question of Governance?

Bell, Brian - 2016

responds more to increases in shareholders' return performance than to decreases. Further, this asymmetry is stronger when …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456270

Governance and Comovement Under Common Ownership

Edmans, Alex - 2014

This paper studies the corporate governance and asset pricing implications of investors owning blocks in multiple firms. Common wisdom is that multi-firm ownership weakens governance because the blockholder is spread too thinly. We show that this need not be the case. In a single-firm benchmark,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458246

The Impact of Competition on Management Quality : Evidence from Public Hospitals

Bloom, Nicholas - 2010

In this paper we examine the causal impact of competition on management quality. We analyze the hospital sector where … management quality - measured using a new survey tool - is strongly correlated with financial and clinical outcomes such as … a greater number of neighboring hospitals) is positively correlated with increased management quality, and this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462620

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, Alex - 2007

This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278

Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia

Edmans, Alex - 2013

This paper links the impending vesting of CEO equity to reductions in real investment. Existing studies measure the manager's short-term concerns using the sensitivity of his equity to the stock price. However, in myopia theories, the driver of short-termism is not the magnitude of incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459254

Blockholders and Corporate Governance

Edmans, Alex - 2013

shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459088

The Effect of Liquidity on Governance

Edmans, Alex - 2011

disposal. Since the threat of governance, not just actual governance, can discipline managers, we use Section 13 filings to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461091