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Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

Managerial Miscalibration

Ben-David, Itzhak - 2010

Using a unique 10-year panel that includes more than 13,300 expected stock market return probability distributions, we find that executives are severely miscalibrated, producing distributions that are too narrow: realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462440

CEO-Board Dynamics

Graham, John R. - 2019

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479953

A Corporate Beauty Contest

Graham, John R. - 2010

We conduct beauty contest experiments, using close to 2,000 subjects to study the facial traits of CEOs. In one experiment we use pairs of photographs and find that subjects rate CEO faces as appearing more "competent" and less "likable" than non-CEO faces. Another experiment matches CEOs from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462745

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326

Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Policies

Ben-David, Itzhak - 2007

Miscalibration is a standard measure of overconfidence in both psychology and economics. Although it is often used in lab experiments, there is scarcity of evidence about its effects in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and whether their miscalibration impacts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464935

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, Alex - 2007

This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Gabaix, Xavier - 2006

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300

Payout Policy in the 21st Century

Brav, Alon - 2003

factors that drive dividend and share repurchase policies. We find that managers are very reluctant to cut dividends, that … repurchases is viewed by managers as being more flexible than using dividends, permitting a better opportunity to optimize … investment. Managers like to repurchase shares when they feel their stock is undervalued and in an effort to affect EPS. Dividend …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469041