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Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance - Independent Directors, Non-Executive Chairs, and the Importance of the Devil's Advocate

Morck, Randall - 2004

The Common Law, parliamentary democracy, and academia all institutionalize dissent to check undue obedience to authority; and corporate governance reformers advocate the same in boardrooms. Many corporate governance disasters could often be averted if directors asked hard questions, demanded...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468049

Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?

Morck, Randall - 1989

the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies …, when it buys a rapidly growing target , and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition …. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012476048

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, Alex - 2007

This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Gabaix, Xavier - 2006

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300

The Dynamics of Inequality

Gabaix, Xavier - 2015

in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457305

Powerful Independent Directors

Fogel, Kathy - 2014

cash flow retention, more CEO accountability, and less earnings management. We posit that more powerful independent … errant top managers, or both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458854

Corporate Governance, Business Group Governance and Economic Development Traps

Dau, Luis - 2020

Every firm in a developed economy relies on the mere existence of countless other firms to keep prices competitive up and down all supply chains. Without this network externality, no firm forms; and without many firms, no network forms; locking in a low-income trap. Business group governance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482288