Showing 1 - 10 of 19
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
We use a unique corpus of job descriptions for C-suite positions to document skills requirements in top managerial occupations across a large sample of firms. A novel algorithm maps the text of each executive search into six separate skill clusters reflecting cognitive, interpersonal, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585443
This paper uses novel, firm-level measures derived from communications metadata before and after a CEO transition in 102 firms to study if CEO turnover impacts employees' communication flows. We find that CEO turnover leads to an initial decrease in intra-firm communication, followed by a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012599332
We investigate whether top managers affect the performance of large and complex public sector organizations, using as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479802
We explore the critical question of how executives make strategic decisions. Utilizing a new survey of 262 CEO alumni of Harvard Business School, we gather evidence on four aspects of each executive's business strategy: its overall structure, its formalization, its development, and its...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482172
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326
This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300
learning algorithm. The algorithm uncovers two distinct behavioral types: "leaders" and "managers". Leaders focus on multi …-function, high-level meetings, while managers focus on one-to-one meetings with core functions. Firms with leader CEOs are on average …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455433