Showing 1 - 10 of 11
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086
its performance. We demonstrate that following periods of abnormally good performance, managers are more likely to call … GIM Index or the proportion of activist shareholders. Following these special meetings, we find that the next quarter … following good firm performance or a desire to reward management for good past performance. Overall, our evidence seems more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461596
Tracking the movement of top managers across firms, we document the importance of manager-specific fixed effects in … managers' corporate strategies, such as their preferences for internal growth and financial conservatism. Managers' early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481342
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326
This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278
This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300
in top income inequality is driven by the rise of "superstar" entrepreneurs or managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457305
hierarchical management, and feel more accountable to stakeholders such as employees and banks than they do to shareholders. They …Using a survey of 800 CEOs in 22 emerging economies we show that CEOs' management styles and philosophy vary with the … arrangements in how intensively family members are involved in management …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459265
We show that economic conditions when managers enter the labor market have long-run effects on their career paths and … managerial styles. Managers who began their careers during recessions become CEOs more quickly, but at smaller firms. They also … environment is important to the formation and selection of managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461067