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Malmendier, Ulrike - 2008

Compensation, status, and press coverage of managers in the U.S. follow a highly skewed distribution: a small number of … books. The incidence of earnings management increases after winning awards. The effects are strongest in firms with weak … that the ex-post consequences of media-induced superstar status for shareholders are negative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464506

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

Overconfidence and Early-life Experiences : The Impact of Managerial Traits on Corporate Financial Policies

Malmendier, Ulrike - 2010

beyond traditional capital-structure determinants. First, managers who believe that their firm is undervalued view external … financing as overpriced, especially equity. Such overconfident managers use less external finance and, conditional on accessing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462992

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463104

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463326

Corporate Financial Policies With Overconfident Managers

Malmendier, Ulrike - 2007

and within firms, including variation in debt conservatism and in pecking-order behavior. Managers who believe that their …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465077

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Edmans, Alex - 2007

This paper presents a unified framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model's closed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465278

Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?

Gabaix, Xavier - 2006

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO's pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466300

Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market's Reaction

Malmendier, Ulrike - 2004

market reacts significantly more negatively to takeover bids by overconfident managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467876

CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

Malmendier, Ulrike - 2004

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467882